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UNION REPRESENTATIVES AS
CORPORATE DIRECTORS: THE
CHALLENGE TO THE
ADVERSARIAL MODEL OF LABOR
RELATIONS
Robert A. McCormick*

Maybe the adversary relationship is
precisely what is wrong with the American labor movement.
-Douglas Fraser 1
I'm afraid it's a sellout.
-Maye L. Amos,1
Chrysler employee
In 1979, during the collective bargaining negotiations between
the United Auto Workers Union ("UAW") and the Chrysler
Corporation, the parties agreed upon a union proposal of a revolutionary nature in American labor-management relations.
Chrysler Chairman Lee A. Iacocca would recommend that Douglas Fraser, President of the UAW, be elected to the board of
directors of the corporation; in return, the union granted wage
and benefit concessions, and agreed to work for the company's
loan guarantee plan. 8 In May 1980, Chrysler shareholders accepted the recommendation of the nominating committee, and
Fraser, in his words, "became the first trade unionist to serve on
the board of a major private corporation in this country.""
1 Associate Professor of Law, Detroit College of Law. B.A., 1969, Michigan State University; J.D., 1973, University of Michigan. I would like to thank Joseph Canfield, Class
of 1982, Detroit College of Law, for his abundant assistance throughout the development
of this Article. My thanks go also to Rudolph Wartella and Richard Goodman, Detroit
College of Law, for their research assistance and to my secretary, Mary Ann Hill, for her
preparation of the manuscript.
1. Blue Collars in the Board Room, TIME, May 19, 1980, at 78, 78.
2. Id.
3. See The Risk in Putting a Union Chief an the Board, Bus. WK., May 19, 1980, at
149; The $203 Millian Seat an the Board, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5, 1979, at 82; Chrysler's
Blue-Callar Director, TIME, Nov. 5, 1979, at 84; N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1979, at 1, col. 4;
Wall St. J., Oct. 29, 1979, at 6, col. 2; Wall St. J., Oct. 26, 1979, at 3, col. 1.
4. Fraser, Labor's Voice an the Board, NEWSWEEK, May 26, 1980, at 13, 13. Subsequent to Fraser's election to the Chrysler Board, in the fall of 1980, the management of
the American Motors Corporation ("AMC") agreed conditionally with the UAW to seat a
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Whether this event constitutes a temporary aberration in industrial relations, born of the particular circumstances of the
employer and the innovative leadership of the union, or whether
it represents a trend toward the European experience of employee representation in management affairs,11 is the subject of
some debate and conjecture. 6 Nevertheless, it is difficult to overstate the magnitude of this departure from the role played by
unions during the past century in their relations with management. Orgai:iized labor and management have long viewed each
other as adversaries. At the same time, unions have traditionally
considered their interests to be served best by a limited role and
have thus spurned broader managerial activities within enterprises employing their members. The acceptance of a role in corporate governance by a union official represents a major departure from labor's traditional approach and constitutes an
experiment with nonadversarial employment relations at the
policy-making level of the enterprise. 7 In this venture, the UAW
and Chrysler have ushered in an entirely new vision of American
union representative on the company's governing board, see Wall St. J., Sept. 17, 1980,
at 4, col. 1, with the major condition being that approval of the undertaking be obtained
from the Department of Justice and the Labor Department, see Wall St. J., Mar. 2, 1981,
at 3, col. 3. The Justice Department, however, was "unable to state a present intention to
institute or not to institute antitrust enforcement proceedings challenging contemporaneous service by members of the UAW on the boards of AMC and Chrysler." Interlocking Directorates-Union Representation, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 11 50,425, at 55,968
(Feb. 26, 1981). The Labor Department, on the other hand, did approve the arrangement. See Labor Department on UAW AMC Board Seat, 2 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No.
106, at 147 (Feb. 23, 1981) (finding that the UAW-AMC agreement would not violate the
Taft-Hartley or Landrum-Griffin Acts).
A few initiatives similar to these recent developments in the automobile industry have
occurred in other settings as well. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1982, at 32, col. 4 (midw. ed.)
(Pan American World Airways nominated an employee who was also a union official to
its board of directors); cf. Wall St. J., Apr. 28, 1972, at 34, col. 1 (employees of United
Air Lines defeated in an attempt at stockholders' meeting to gain representation on the
company's board).
5. See generally A. STURMTHAL, COMPARATIVE LABOR MOVEMENTS (1972); Davies, Employee Representation on Company Boards and Participation in Corporate Planning,
38 Mon. L. REV. 254 (1975); Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspectives
from the German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23 (1966); Note, Employee Codetermination: Origins in Germany, Present Practice in Europe, and Applicability to the United States,
14 HARV. J. LEGJS. 947, 949-87 (1977).
6. See Senser, Industrial Democracy, Ltd., 107 COMMONWEAL 489 (1980); Note, Serving Two Masters: Union Representation on Corporate Boards of Directors, 81 CoLUM.
L. REV. 639, 640 (1981) ("Should this first example of employee representation in a major corporation prove successful, it is likely that the practice will become increasingly
common."); More Unions Knocking at Boardroom Doors?, INDus. WK., Nov. 12, 1979, at
19.
7. At the same time, the UAW and the automobile manufacturers are at the forefront
of innovations aimed at increasing worker involvement in production decisions. See The
New Industrial Relations, Bus. WK., May 11, 1981, at 84; infra note 114.
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labor-management relations, the legal ramifications of which remain largely unexplored. 8 The question must be asked, therefore, whether and to what degree the National Labor Relations
Act ("NLRA") 9 will accommodate deviations from the conventional model of labor-management relations.
Moreover, further questions arise concerning whether this departure from a limited, adversarial union role will be beneficial
for labor. A substantial majority of union officials remain skeptical about this new arrangement; 10 some reject the approach outright11 while others are more ambivalent,1 11 but all must certainly
8. Some recent commentary, however, has explored certain aspects of the question.
See Note, supra note 6; Comment, Broadening the Board: Labor Participation in Corporate Governance, 34 SW. L.J. 963 (1980); Note, Employee Representative on the Corporate Board of Directors: Implications Under Labor, Antitrust, and Corporate Law, 27
WAYNE L. REV. 367 (1980).
9. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-166 (West 1973
& Supp. 1974-1980)). For treatment of the background and development of the NLRA
and its amendments, see generally J. BELLACE & A. BERKOWITZ, THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN
ACT (1979); H. MiLLIS & E. BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY (1950);
The Developing Labor Law (C. Morris ed. 1971); Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (pts. 1 & 2), 61 HARV. L. REV. 1, 274 (1947-1948).
10. Following his election to the Chrysler board, Fraser said: "This development naturally has stirred a vigorous debate in management and labor circles. Some view it as a
breakthrough, others as an abomination." Fraser, supra note 4, at 13. This is not the first
time, however, that the UAW and the automobile manufacturers have negotiated arrangements perceived as revolutionary at the time but now considered standard practice.
For example, in 1948 the union and the manufacturers negotiated the first cost-of-living
escalator provisions, and in 1955 the UA W's supplemental unemployment benefit program was first agreed upon as part of a collective bargaining contract. Today, such programs are commonplace. See id.
11. See, e.g., Letter from Ted Reed, Dir. of Research, Int'! Union of Operating
Eng'rs, to author (Mar. 19, 1981) (union opposes concept of labor representatives on
corporate governing boards); Letter from Robert L. Wartinger, Vice Pres., Int'! Typographical Union, to author (Mar. 13, 1981) (rejecting notion of placing union officials on
corporate boards, because to do so would create an undesirable "one with management"
impression); Letter from Walter L. Davis, Dir. of Info., United Food & Commercial
Workers Int'! Union, to author (Mar. 5, 1981) (stating that Union President William H.
Wynn has publicly opposed participation on corporate boards); Letter from Victor W.
Fuentealba, Pres., Am. Fed. of Musicians, to author (Feb. 19, 1981) ("there is a definite
conflict of interest when a union representative serves on the governing board of an employer"); Letter from Reginald Newell, Dir. of Research, Int'! Ass'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers, to author (Feb. 9, 1981) ("If anything, the attacks on organized labor in recent years by Corporate America and the the New Right have reinforced our
negative views . . . . ") (all letters on file with the Journal of Law Reform).
12. See, e.g., Letter from Wilbur Daniels, Vice Pres., Int'! Ladies Garment Workers
Union, to author (Feb. 18, 1981) (no position taken on the question of union representatives serving as corporate directors); Letter from William Casamo, Exec. Ass't to the
Pres., United Paperworkers Int'! Union, to author (Feb. 11, 1981) (noting that the subject has never been "seriously addressed or entertained," and concluding that "there is
no genuine interest or concern''. with the question); Letter from Charles R. Armstrong,
Gen. Counsel, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of Am., to author (Feb.
6, 1981) (no firm union position, either pro or con, on question of union representation)
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recognize the possible ramifications of the Chrysler-UAW experiment for the future of labor policy in this country. 13
This Article addresses these questions first by discussing the
predominant philosophical approach adopted by unions in their
dealings with management, and then describing several ways in
which the labor laws reflect this traditional model of employment relations by showing, first, that the influence of unions has
been limited to circumscribed categories of business decisions.
The Article next examines decisions made by the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") and the courts that have carefully sought to separate employer from employee, assuming their
interests to be inherently antagonistic. Then follows an evaluation of the NLRB's treatment of deviations from the traditional
model of labor-management relations, with special emphasis
given those circumstances under which union officials will be
permitted to assume an active, participatory function in the entire spectrum of business decisions. Finally, the Article concludes by considering the implications, particularly for the individual member-employee, of a broader role for labor in
corporate governance.

I.

THE ADVERSARIAL TRADITION IN LABOR-MANAGEMENT

RELATIONS

At the outset, it is clear that the involvement of employee representatives in the whole range of management decisions represents a fundamental departure from the theory and practice of
trade unionism as followed, in the main, during the past century
in this country. Despite periodic departures from the predominant approach, the prevailing spirit of the American trade-union
movement has been that of "business unionism"; unions have
primarily, though not exclusively, endeavored to improve wages,
hours, and working conditions for their members, and have been
(all letters on file with the Journal of Law Reform).

13. See The $203 Million Seat on the Board, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5, 1979, at 82 (Lane
Kirkland, then Secretary-Treasurer and now President of the AFL-CIO, stated he would
"wait to see how the whole thing works out"); Letter from Anne C. Green, Dir. of Research and Educ., Int'l Chemical Workers Union, to author (Feb. 18, 1981) ("Certainly
the idea is exciting and a great deal of discussion has taken place both within the Executive Board and [among] members of this union.") (on file with the Journal of Law Reform). But cf. N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1981, at Al, col. 4 (while not rejecting the possibility
for union representation on corporate boards, AFL-CIO President Kirkland argued that
control over pension funds and other corporate assets has far greater potential as a
source of union strength).
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only secondarily concerned with broader issues of social and corporate policy. 14 This orientation emerged as the central force behind the Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions
formed a century ago 111 and reorganized in 1886 as the American
Federation of Labor. 18 The theory rejected utopian and radical
approaches to relations between workers and owners and
adopted a "philosophy of pure wage consciousness,"17 which
viewed the interests of management and labor to be inherently
in conflict. The purpose of unions was to maximize wages and
better the terms and conditions of employment for their members, because the goal of managers, on the other hand, was to
minimize labor costs and to secure a competent work force at
the lowest wage the market permitted.
Unions considered their interests to be served best by a limited focus, and, as a result, repudiated more expansive managerial roles within corporate enterprises. Samuel Gompers, the
Federation's first leader and influential early thinker, accepted,
if not embraced, capitalism and sought to enlarge the bargaining
power of the industrial worker. 18 Gompers believed that capital
and labor were natural adversaries in a struggle to reap the profits of industry. He did not believe workers and management
shared common interests; rather, each sought distinct and different ends. 19 In his view, therefore, labor's role was solely to nego.J

14. See A. REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 2 (1962). Regarding the theory
and practice of trade unionism in the United States, see generally I. BERNSTEIN, THE
LEAN YEARS (1960); A. BLUM, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1972); H.
PELLING, AMERICAN LABOR (1960); M. PERLMAN, LABOR UNION THEORIES IN AMERICA
(1958); S. PERLMAN, A THEORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT (1928).
The program of the Industrial Workers of the World ("I.W.W."), which began in 1905,
probably represented the most radical departure from the traditional trade union approach. Its aim was the immediate abolition of the wage system and the elimination of
capitalism. Like ~ther challenges to conventional trade unionism, it faltered.
The overwhelming bulk of American workingmen remained as fundamentally
opposed to the I.W.W. philosophy as were their employers or the middle class
generally. The American Federation of Labor, which lost no opportunity to discredit and attack its radical rival, continued to dominate the labor movement
and revolutionary unionism made no real headway against business unionism.
F. DULLES, LABOR IN AMERICA 222-23 (3d ed. 1966).
15. See F. DULLES, supra note 14, at 157-61.
16. See B. MELTZER, LABOR LAW 6 (2d ed. 1977).
17. See S. PERLMAN, supra note 14, at 197-207.
18. See generally S. GOMPERS, SEVENTY YEARS OF LIFE AND LABOR (1925); M. HILLQUIT, S. GOMPERS & M.J. HAYES, THE DoUBLE EDGE OF LABOR'S SwoRD (1914 & photo.
reprint 1971); S. KAUFMAN, SAMUEL GOMPERS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR, 1848-1896 (1973); L. REED, THE LABOR PHILOSOPHY OF SAMUEL GOMPERS
(1930 & photo. reprint 1966).
19. Gompers observed that "[t]here has never yet existed identity of interests between buyer and seller of an article. If you have anything to sell and I want to buy it
your interest and mine are not identical." 7 U.S. INDUSTRIAL CoMM'N, REP<>RT, testimony
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tiate on behalf of workers.
By and large, the pragmatic posture espoused by Gompers
still inheres in the approach of most unions toward their relations with management. Indeed, while most unions have not
adopted an official position on the propriety of union officers'
taking positions in corporate governance, 20 many question the
wisdom of the broader role secured by Fraser. This new venture
is seen by numerous union officials as impractical,21 illogical,22 or
not feasible, 23 while others see the arrangement as useful only
when the employer is in severe financial difficulty. 24 Among the
concerns articulated is the fear that by obtaining positions on
governing boards, unions will become "one with management"H
- with the result that unions' ability to improve working conditions and redress grievances for employees will be diminished. 18
at 655 (1901) (statement of Samuel Gompers); see also M. PERLMAN, supra note 14, at
271 (Gompers felt "that those who thought that labor management would come to recognize one another's rights and share identical interests were talking of something 'very
remote and very far removed'") (quoting id.). The Preamble to the American Federation
of Labor's first constitution embodied Gompers' view of this inherent conflict: "Whereas
... a struggle is going on in all the civilized world between the Capitalists and the Laborers which grows in intensity from year to year . . . . " P. JACOBS, OLD BEFORE ITS
TIME: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 28 (1963).
20. See supra note 12; see also, e.g., Letter from AnJ!e C. Green, supra note 13; Letter from Vera Miller, Vice Pres., Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, to
author (Feb. 11, 1981) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform); Letter from William 0.
Kuhl, Dir. of Research & Educ., Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers, to author (Feb. 11, 1981) (on file with the Journal of Law
Reform); Letter from June McMahon, Service Employees Int'l Union, to author (Feb. 6,
1981) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform); Telephone interview with Arthur F.
Kane, Dir. of Research & Educ., Int'! Bhd. Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen &
Helpers of Am. (Feb. 5, 1981). But see supra note 11.
21. See, e.g., Letter from Robert L. Wartinger, Vice Pres., lnt'l Typographical Union,
to author (Mar. 13, 1981); Letter from L. Gerald Carlisle, Treasurer, Int'! Union of
Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen, to author (Feb. 20, 1981); Letter from William J.
Donlon, Gen. Counsel, Bhd. Ry., Airline & Steamship Clerks, to author (Feb. 20, 1981)
(all letters on file with the Journal of Law Reform).
22. See, e.g., UNITED ELEC., RADIO & MACHINE WORKERS OF AM., 1980 GENERAL OFFICERS REP. 16-18 [hereinafter cited as 1980 UE REP.) (on file with the Journal of Law
Reform); Letter from Walter L. Davis, supra note 11.
23. See, e.g., Letter from Walter L. Davis, supra note 11; Letter from L. Gerald Carlisle, supra note 21; Letter from William A. McGowan, Gen. Counsel, United Bhd. of
Carpenters & Joiners of Am., to author (Feb. 10, 1981) (on file with the Journal of Law
Reform).
24. See letter from Walter L. Davis, supra note 11. Thus, for example, members of
the United Food & Commercial Workers International Union who were employees of the
Rath Packing Company - which had suffered through five consecutive years of losses purchased 60% of the company's stock and thereafter appointed 10 of the 16 members
of the corporate board. Woodworth, Workers Take Over, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1980, at
A27, col. 1.
25. See Letter from Robert L. Wartinger, supra note 21.
26. See id; see also Address by William W. Winpisinger, Gen. Vice Pres., Int'l Ass'n
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Although some union officials appear receptive to arrangements
that would allow labor to divide the number of seats on corporate boards equally with management, they view a single union
voice as "token" representation with "diluted" effect. 111 The very
strong perception continues that relations between labor and
management are intrinsically antagonistic, so that collaborative
efforts will not ultimately benefit employees;118 as well, there remains a general preference for a limited approach to labor-management relations that eschews roles traditionally assigned to
management. 29 The comments of one labor official embody this
prevailing union sentiment:
Despite all the institutional advertising that industry
does about its social responsibilities, the purpose of business is to make a profit. If profits can be increased by
holding down wages, speeding up production or replacing
workers with machines, this is the way it will be done.
of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, at the University of Michigan-Dearborn (Dec. 2,
1976) ("workers can receive a better share of the fruits of free enterprise at bargaining
tables than in board rooms") (Mr. Winpisinger is now president of the Association) (on
file with the Journal of Law Reform).
27. See, e.g., Letter from William J. Donlon, supra note 21; Letter from Roy A. Ockert, Coordinator, Dep't of Research, Educ. & Collective Bargaining Coordination, Int'!
Woodworkers of Am., to author (Feb. 20, 1981) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform);
Letter from Reginald Newell, Dir. of Research, lnt'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers, to author (Feb. 9, 1981) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform).
28. See, e.g., 1980 UE REP., supra note 22, at 16 ("There are irreconcilable differences between labor and management on the company level because profit is produced
from the labor power of workers."); More Unions Knocking at Boardroom Do<J[s?, supra
note 6, at 20 (Teamsters President Frank Fitzsimmons observed: "Labor and management have always been in an adversary position, and I do not think putting a union
official on the board of directors ... will change that position."); Telephone interview
with Arthur F. Kane, supra note 20.
29. See, e.g., Letter from William J. Donlon, supra note 21 ("Historically, ... our
organization has preferred to have management personnel assume those responsibilities
of management."); Letter from Francis X. Burkhardt, Dir. of Research, Int'l Bhd. of
Painters and Allied Trades, to author (Feb. 10, 1981) ("With regard to the management
of operating costs, sales, marketing, etc. an advisory position for union representatives is
as far as I would urge our Local Union officers to push for . . . . ") (on file with the
Journal of Law Reform). Chrysler Chairman Iacocca, however, espouses a different
perspective:
I have to co-operate with the union because I got the guy on my board. I'm
forced into dialogue. How can I lose? You say, "Oh yeah, but ideologically, they
got their nose in the tent, the union will find out your decision to close a plant."
Well, hell, they're gonna find out one way or another. I don't look at it like a
purist who says, "Oh my God, my management prerogatives are going up in
smoke." I think the world is a-changin'.
Some Sayings from Chairman Lee, Detroit Free Press, Sept. 14, 1980, at E9, col. 1; see
also Simison, Chrysler Lauds Strong Performance of UAW's Fraser as Board Member,
Wall St. J., Mar. 12, 1981, at 33, col. 4.
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. As lorig as these are the hard, cold realities of the
basic relationship between management and labor, the
union's place is not at the director's table, making management decisions, but at the bargaining table, protecting
and pressing the rights of the work force. 80
II.

THE LIMITED ROLE OF UNIONS UNDER THE LAW

The NLRA institutionalized the concept of the limited union
role, assigning to labor and management respective areas of sovereignty. The traditional union emphasis upon wages, hours, and
working conditions 81 is embodied in the distinction between
mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining. 82 One effect of
this dichotomy is that although a union may insist that the employer bargain with it regarding subjects deemed mandatory, the
right is reserved to the employer to implement unilaterally decisions concerning those subjects deemed permissive. 88 While the
union might have the statutory right to bargain about the effects
of a decision," its right to involvement in the initial deliberations of an employer exists only in circumscribed areas. As Fraser made clear when he took the directorship, this limited sphere
of influence motivated the UAW leadership to seek a broader
role in directing the Chrysler Corporation: "Workers need and
deserve a voice in determining their own destiny. To be effective, that voice must be heard before decisions are made, rather
than afterward. We need to play a role in the decision-making
process ,_ instead of reacting once the corporation has set its
30. Address by William W. Winpisinger, supra note 26, at 5-6 (emphasis in original).
31. See S. GOMPERS, LABOR AND THE EMPLOYER 286 (1920) ("Among the matters that
properly come within the scope of collective bargaining are wages, hours of labor, conditions and relations of employment . . . . But there is no belief held in the trade unions
that its members shall control the plant or usurp the rights of the owners."); J. GETMAN,
LABOR RELATIONS 40 (1978) ("The unions have rarely sought to become involved in decisions concerning production, except to the extent such decisions have direct impact on
the continuation of existing jobs. Nor have they become involved in questions of management personnel. They have been content to leave such decisions to management.").
32. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (b)(3), (d) (1976). See generally Cox, The Duty To
Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401 (1958); Fleming, The Obligation to Bargain in Good Faith, 47 VA. L. REv. 988 (1961).
33. See Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers Local No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,
404 U.S. 157 (1971).
34. See, e,g,, Shamrock Dairy, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 998 (1957), modified, 124 N.L.R.B.
494 (1959), enforced, 280 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Bickford Shoes, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B.
1346 (1954); T.A. TREDWAY & S.E. TAYLOR, 109 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1954); Brown Truck &
Trailer Mfg. Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953).
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A. The Mandatory-Permissive Dichotomy
In the absence of a duty to bargain with a union, an employer
has always possessed complete discretion, except as otherwise
limited by law, to order the terms and conditions of employment
and to determine all other business matters that could affect
employees. 88 Because a great many decisions bear upon conditions of employment, the degree to which employees' selection of
a union curtails this freedom is a question that goes to the heart
of labor policy which has long proven difficult to resolve. 87
The NLRA originally contained no definition of collective bargaining. 88 Thus, at one time, it could be argued forcefully that although the Act gave legal status to the representative selected
by a majority of employees and directed the employer to "bargain collectively" with that representative - the subjects to be
negotiated were to be left solely to the parties.89 It has now long
been recognized, though, that the NLRB has the authority to
determine the scope of subjects about which bargaining may be
compelled.•0 As early as 1940, the Board assumed this authority ,41 and Congress soon endorsed the Board's approach to delimiting mandatory subjects of bargaining.41 Section 8(d) of the
35. Fraser, supra note 4, at 13.
36. See generally Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting
the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1967); Comment,
Employment at Will and the Law of Contracts, 23 BUFFALO L. REv. 211 (1973).
37. See Cox & Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor
Relations Board, 63 HARV. L. REv. 389, 401 (1950) ("There are few more troublesome
problems in industrial relations than those of determining the respective responsibilities
of management and union for decisons which are of practical concern to both the employer and the employee.").
38. Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA makes it unlawful for an employer to "refuse to
bargain collectively" with the employee representative, subject to § 9(a). 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(5) (1976). Section 9(a) establishes that the employee representative is the exclusive representative for the purposes of collective bargaining regarding rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)
(1976).
39. See, e.g., 79 CONG. REC. 7659 (1935) ("The bill does not go beyond the office door.
It leaves the discussion between the employer and the employee, and the agreements
which they may or may not make, voluntary.") (remarks of Sen. Walsh).
40. See Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 219 n.2 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring); Cox & Dunlop, supra note 37, at 397.
41. See Singer Mfg. Co., 24 N.L.R.B. 444 (1940), enforced, 119 F.2d 131 (7th Cir.
1941); Wilson & Co., 19 N.L.R.B. 990, 999, enforced, 115 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1940).
42. During consideration of the Taft-Hartley amendments, the House bill contained
an actual list of mandatory subjects excluding all others. See H.R. 3020 § 2(11), 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), reprinted in 1 N.L.R.B., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY or THE LABOR
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NLRA, as enacted in 1947, defined collective bargaining as
"[t]he performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and
the representative· of the employees to meet at reasonable times
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment."43
Notwithstanding the open-endedness of the statute, however,
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment"
were undeniably words of limitation, for "Congress had no expectation that the elected union representative would become an
equal partner in the running of the business enterprise in which
union members are employed."44 Though the further elucidation
of "wages" and "hours" has caused relatively little difficulty, the
nature of "conditions of employment" has been hotly debated
and vigorously litigated for many years. 411 A wide variety of business decisions greatly affect the job security and working conditions of employees. Decisions regarding product choice and design, the substitution of labor-saving devices, plant relocation or
closure, and subcontracting, although traditionally considered to
be appropriately within the sole discretion of management,
clearly have grave implications for employees. Indeed, oftentimes the very existence of jobs may be at stake. Nevertheless,
numerous interpretations of the Act'6 have excluded the influence of organized labor in these critical areas.
For many years, the Board espoused the view that an employer had no duty under NLRA section 8(a)(5) to consult with
the bargaining representative before deciding matters such as
subcontracting and plant closure, so long as the decision was not
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 31, 40 (1948). Congress rejected this approach in
favor of continuing in the NLRB the power to further define mandatory subjects of bargaining on a case-by-case basis. See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 101 S. Ct.
2573, 2579 n.14 (1981).
43. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
44. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 101 S. Ct. 2573, 2579 (1981).
45. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979); Allied Chemical & Alkali
Workers Local No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157 (1971); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); American Smelting & Refining Co. v.
NLRB, 406 F.2d 552 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 935 (1969); S. 3548, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1960) (congressional attempt to limit "conditions of employment"); Cox, Labor
Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term, 1957, 44 VA. L. REV. 1057, 1083-84
(1958); Rabin, Fibreboard and the Termination of Bargaining Unit Work: The Search
for Standards in Defining the Scope of the Duty to Bargain, 71 CoLUM. L. REV. 803
(1971).
46. E.g., First Nat'! Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 101 S. Ct. 2573 (1981); Royal Typewriter Co. v. NLRB, 533 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d
108 (8th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961); National
Car Rental System, 252 N.L.R.B. 159 (1980); Summit Tooling Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 479
(1972).
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motivated by anti-union animus. 47 Board rulings required only
that the employer bargain with the union concerning the effects
of such decisions, as distinct from the decisions themselves.' 8
Similarly, the Supreme Court early, and consistently thereafter,
interpreted the law as embracing the customary, limited approach toward the union role,' 9 and relied upon existing contracts to determine the subjects that the parties themselves considered appropriate for collective bargaining. IHI Thus, the
circumscribed sphere of influence traditionally embraced by organized labor became a significant element of the legal framework governing labor-management relations.
This approach, however, has not been followed uniformly by
the Board, which in 1962 adopted a much more expansive view
of the term "conditions of employment." In essence, the Board
began to look at the effect of employer decisions upon the bargaining unit in determining whether a mandatory bargaining
subject was involved. As a result, the Board held that an employer violated its duty to bargain by unilaterally subcontracting, for economic reasons only, work formerly performed by unit
employees. 111
This constituted a major expansion of the role traditionally
sought by and assigned to labor. If unions had the right, and
employers the correlative duty, to bargain about .all decisions
even tangentially affecting conditions of employment, there
would be an enormously broad range of business decisions subject to mandatory bargaining. This approach by the Board, then,
constituted a fundamental challenge to the limited model of industrial relations, and came before the Supreme Court in the
controversial case of Fibreboard Paper Products v. NLRB. 111
47. See Mahoning Mining Co., 61 N.L.R.B. 792, 803 (1945) ("the Board has never
held that . . . an employer may not in good faith . . . change his business structure, sell
or contract out a portion of his operations, or make any like change . . . without first
consulting the bargaining representative"); see also Walter Holm & Co., 87 N.L.R.B.
1169 (1949) ("Section 8(a)(5) does not require an employer to consult with its employees'
representative as a prerequisite to going out of business for nondiscriminatory reasons").
48. See cases cited supra note 34.
49. See NLRB v. American Nat'! Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 408 (1952) (collective bargaining "has been considered to absorb and give statutory approval to the philosophy of
bargaining as worked out in the labor movement in the United States") (quoting Order
of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 346 (1944)).
50. E.g., NLRB v. American Nat'! Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
51. See Town & Country Mfg. Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1022, 1027 (1962) ("the elimination
of unit jobs albeit for economic reasons, is a matter within the statutory phrase 'other
terms and conditions of employment' and is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act"), enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir.
1963).
52. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
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Fibreboard and Its Progeny

Fibreboard presented the narrow issue whether an employer's
decision to subcontract work would be considered a mandatory
subject of bargaining when, as a result, employees in the bargaining unit were replaced by employees of an independent contractor to perform the same work under similar working conditions. The Court concluded that bargaining over this
subcontracting decision could be compelled,118 though it expressly restricted its holding to the particular facts of the case.
Justice Stewart authored an influential concurrence, setting
forth his view of the appropriate role of unions in business
decisionmaking:

Nothing the Court holds today should be understood
as imposing a duty to bargain collectively regarding such
managerial decisions [as liquidation of assets or investment in labor-saving devices], which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control. Decisions concerning the commitment of investment capital and the basic scope of the
enterprise are not in themselves primarily about conditions of employment, though the effect of the decision
may be necessarily to terminate employment. If, as I.
think clear, the purpose of§ 8(d) is to describe a limited .
area subject to the duty of collective bargaining, those.
management decisions which are fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate enterprise or which impinge
only indirectly upon employment security should be excluded from that area. 114
The Supreme Court's ruling, however, only defined the contours of the debate. Cases decided after Fibreboard evinced a
marked disagreement between the Board and the courts regarding the right of unions to bargain about decisions arguably
53. The Court marshalled several factors to support its conclusion that the decision
to subcontract should be considered a mandatory bargaining subject. First, the decision
had the effect of terminating employment, thus falling within the literal scope of the
statutory "terms and conditions of employment" phraseology. Id. at 210. Second, compelled bargaining in the situation at hand effectuated the purposes of the Act by "bringing a problem of vital concern to labor and management within the framework established by Congress as most conducive to industrial peace." Finally, the Court found that
subcontracting decisions frequently were part of collective bargaining contracts, indicating that labor and management considered the subject to be one appropriate for negotiation. Id.
54. Id. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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within the "core of entrepreneurial control." The Board - despite substantial opposition from the courts of appeals - continued to hold that economically motivated decisions to discontinue operations and relocate, 511 to reorganize marketing
operations, 66 or to close part of a business67 were issues about
which labor could insist upon collective bargaining. 68

C. First National Maintenance Corp. and the Limited Scope
of Collective Bargaining
The Supreme Court, in First National Maintenance Corp. v.
NLRB, 69 recently addressed this fundamental disagreement over
the scope of an employer's obligation to negotiate with the
union. The employer had elected to terminate an unprofitable
maintenance and service contract, which prompted a union demand to bargain with the employer over the decision. 60 The employer refused, answering that the decision was purely economic
and thus beyond the scope of the union's functions. The NLRB
ruled, however, that the employer could be compelled to bargain
on this subject, 61 and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit enforced the Board's order. 62
The Supreme Court disagreed. It characterized the employer's
55. See Transmarine Navigation Corp., 152 N.L.R.B. 998 (1965), enforcement denied, 380 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1967).
56. See International Harvester Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 712 (1978), enforced on other
grounds, 618 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1980).
57. See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. 462 (1979), enforced as modified, 627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 2573 (1981); Thompson Transport Co.,
165 N.L.R.B. 746 (1967), enforced on other grounds, 406 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1969);
Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 NLRB 561 (1966); see also NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.,
361 F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 935 (1966) (imposing duty to bargain over
partial-closing decisions); cf. Brockway Motor Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720 (3d Cir.
1978) (establishing presumption in favor of bargaining, subject to balancing of parties'
interests). But see NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965)
(denying enforcement of pre-Fibreboard order mandating bargaining); accord NLRB v.
Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965).
58. See generally Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 566 (1966) ("whether a particular management decision must be bargained about should [not) turn on whether the
decision involves the commitment of investment capital, or on whether it may be characterized as involving 'major' or 'basic' change in the nature of the employer's business").
In fact, however, the Board's approach has not been wholly consistent on this question.
See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 101 S. Ct. 2573, 2578 & n.10 (1981).
59. 101 S. Ct. 2573 (1981).
60. The union demanded as well that the employer engage in collective bargaining
over the effects of the decision to terminate this part of the business. Id. at 2576; see
supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
61. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. 462 (1979).
62. NLRB v. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 627 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1980).
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decision as involving a change in the scope and direction of the
enterprise, akin to a decision about whether to be in business at
all. Quoting Justice Stewart's Fibreboard concurrence, the Court
found this subject to be "'not in [itself] primarily about conditions of employment, though the effect of the decision may be
necessarily to terminate employment.' " 88 Significantly, the
Court again endorsed reliance upon industrial custom for determining whether labor and management themselves considered
the matter to be properly a part of collective bargaining, and
found it to be "relatively rare" that contract provisions would
give a union the right to participate in decisions concerning "alteration of the scope of the enterprise. " 84 The Court set forth an
amorphous standard for determining the nature of compulsory
bargaining subjects: "bargaining over management decisions
that have a substantial impact on the continued availability of
employment should be required only if the benefit, for labormanagement relations and the collective bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business.',ea
Under this calculus, the Court concluded that the potential
harm from requiring negotiations over the contract termination
decision outweighed any benefit to be gained from union participation. Further, the Court found that compelled bargai_ning regarding an employer's decision to cancel a portion of its business
could hamper desired flexibility in management judgments,
without significantly augmenting the flow of constructive ideas
into the decisionmaking process. 88
While application of the balancing test to particular business
decisions remains to be developed, there is little question that
the range of subjects about which bargaining may be compelled
by labor organizations will, in part, be circumscribed by the
range of subjects about which labor and management have bargained in the past. Thus, the Court has shaped the future of
collective bargaining according to the historically limited pattern. The burden of attempting to expand the traditional areas
63. 101 S. Ct. at 2580 (quoting Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S.
203, 223 (Stewart, J., concurring)).
64. 101 S. Ct. at 2583.
65. Id. at 2581.
66. Id. at 2586. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented. Citing the
1979 negotiations between the UAW and Chrysler as a factor contributing to the company's ability to stay afloat financially, he argued that union involvement in managerial
activities might contribute greatly to mutually satisfactory decisionmaking. In his view,
therefore, the majority had taken account only of management interests, and had failed
"to consider the legitimate employment interests of the workers and their Union." Id.
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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to include "management decisions that have a substantial impact on the continued availability of employment"87 clearly, after First National Maintenance Corp., rests with the unions.
In seeking the Chrysler appointment, Fraser made it apparent
that the union had been motivated, to a substantial degree, by
frustration over its inability to affect those management decisions having a profound impact on member-employees. "Plant
closings and relocations have hit Chrysler hard. Some may be
inevitable, others shortsighted. The Chrysler Board needs to be
sensitized to the suffering certain decisions inflict on workers."88
Bargaining about severance pay and other "effects" of those decisions was deemed wholly inadequate for addressing the issues
involved - yet they were bound both by tradition and by law to
this limited role.
Ill.

THE ENTERPRISE DIVIDED: LABOR AND MANAGEMENT AS
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT

In serving simultaneously as corporate director and president
of the union, Fraser crosses a demarcation line that Congress,
the NLRB, and the courts have painstakingly sought to define
and preserve. 89 Judicial and NLRB interpretations of the
NLRA, 70 in keeping with the intent of the 1947 congressional
amendments,71 have distinguished between "employees," who
alone enjoy the protections afforded by the Act, and various categories of persons whose interests have been considered more
appropriately allied with management. The purpose and effect
of this distinction has been to separate employer from employee,
whose separate interests have been viewed as being, by their
very nature, antagonistic.
67. Id. at 2581.
68. Fraser, supra note 4, at 13.
69. See, e.g., NLRB v. Mt. Clemens Metal Products Co., 287 F.2d 790, 791 (6th Cir.
1961) ("The employer is under a duty to refrain from any action which will place him on
both sides of the bargaining table."); Nassau & Suffolk Contractors' Assoc., Inc., 118
N.L.R.B. 174, 187 (1957) ("Employees have the right to be represented in collective bargaining negotiations by individuals who have a single-minded loyalty to their interests.")
(emphasis deleted); Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1555-1557 (1954) ("one
purpose of the Act was to draw a clear line of demarcation between supervisory representatives of management and employees because of the possible conflicts in allegiance"). This does not mean, however, that Fraser has violated the labor laws by pursuing dual roles as union president and corporate director. See infra pt. IV.
70. See cases cited infra notes 90-91.
71. See infra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
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The Supervisor as Employer

The original prov1s1ons of the NLRA included all workers
within the term "employee," and contained no disqualifying language for those exercising supervisory authority.1 ll The Board,
except for a brief hiatus,78 ordered employers to bargain even
with organizations made up entirely of foremen and other supervisory employees. 74 In Packard Motor Car v. NLRB,7 1 the Supreme Court approved such a bargaining order over the company's arguments that· management was entitled to its
supervisors' loyalty. The Court held that Congress alone had the
authority either ·to place limitations upon the right of supervisors to organize or to exclude them from the Act's coverage. Justice Douglas, in dissent, placed the implications of the majority
decision for the traditional model of labor relations in broad
perspective:
The present decision . . . tends to obliterate the line
between management and labor . . . . It tends to emphasize that the basic opposing forces in industry are not
management and labor but the operating group on the
one hand and the stockholder and bondholder group on
the other. The industrial problem as so defined comes
down to a contest over a fair division of the gross receipts
of industry between these two groups. The struggle for
control or power between management and labor becomes secondary to a growing unity in their common demands on ownership .
. . . [I]f Congress, when it enacted the National Labor
Relations Act, had in mind such a basic change in industrial philosophy, it would have left some clear and unmis72. 29 u.s.c. § 152(3) (1976).
73. During the period spanning from 1942 to 1945, Board decisions took several different approaches to deciding the proper application of the Act to supervisory employees. In 1942, supervisors were excluded from rank-and-file units, Mueller Brass Co., 39
N.L.R.B. 167 (1942), though their certification in separate units was permitted, Union
Collieries Coal Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 961, supplemental decision, 44 N.L.R.B. 165 (1942),
even if the union were affiliated with the local representing rank-and-file employees,
Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 44 N.L.R.B. 874 (1942). In a space of two years, from 1943-1945,
the Board held that no union could be certified to represent groups of supervisors, except in those industries where supervisors had previously been organized. Yale & Towne
Mfg. Co., 60 N.L.R.B. 626 (1945); Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943).
74. E.g., California Packing Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. 1461 (1946); Godchaux Sugars, Inc.,
44 N.L.R.B. 874 (1942); Union Collieries Coal Co., 444 N.L.R.B. 165 (1942).
75. 330 U.S. 485 (1947), atf'g 157 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1946), enforcing 61 N.L.R.B. 4
(1945).
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takable trace of that purpose. But I find none. 78
The following year, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Amendments to the Act. 77 Clearly motivated by the Packard decision,78
Congress took up the Court's invitation by excluding from the
definition of employee "any individual employed as a supervisor. "79 While section 14(a) of the NLRA permitted supervisors
to become or remain members of a union,80 after Taft-Hartley,
foremen and other supervisors were no longer "employees" of
the employer and therefore were no longer extended the protections of the Act for their concerted activities.81 This change reflected Congress' conclusion that management was entitled to
complete fidelity from its supervisors - and that union membership put supervisors~ interests in conflict with those of
management.
During congressional deliberations over the appropriate
breadth of the exclusion of supervisors from the collective bargaining process, considerable support arose for removing supervisors from protected status only when they were affiliated,
either directly or indirectly, with unions of production employees.82 In this way, it was proposed, the problem of divided
loyalty among supervisors could be met without removing their
right to organize and bargain collectively. This approach, in fact,
had been taken by the same Congress to obviate potential conflicts of interest among plant guards. 88 Its application to supervisors, however, was rejected on the basis that "no one, whether
employer or employee, need have as his agent one who is obligated to those on the other side. " 8 " Therefore, the demarcation
76. 330 U.S. at 494-95 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
77. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (current version at
29 U.S.C.A. §§ 141-187 (West 1973 & Supp. 1974-1980)).
78. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEmsLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 407, 410 (1948)
[hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 105).
79. 29 u.s.c. § 152(3) (1976).
80. Id. § 164(a).
81. See generally Note, The NLRB and Supervisory Status: An Explanation of Inconsistent Results, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1713 (1981).
82. See S. REP. No. 105, supra note 78, at 39-40 (minority views of Sen. Thomas).
83. Section 9(b)(3), added by Taft-Hartley, prevented the Board from including in a
rank-and-file unit "any individual employed as a guard to enforce against employees and
other persons rules to protect property of the employer or to protect the safety of persons on the employer's permises." Neither could a union affiliated with a union that
admitted such persons be certified to represent guards. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1976). But
guards retained the right to organize and bargain collectively.
84. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1947), reprinted in l N.L.R.~. LEmsLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 292, 308 (1948); see
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line between employer and employee was based not upon concerns that supervisors would have ties to particular unions, but
rather upon the sentiment that supervisors protected under the
NLRA might have allegiances to employees generally. 811 Employees were on the "other side"; providing supervisors with the opportunity to organize under the Act was viewed as allying them
with employees and, thus, against the interests of employers. 88
In amending the Act to exclude supervisors, Congress was addressing, of course, a situation different from that posed by Fraser's election to the Chrysler Board. Nonetheless, that election
contrasts vividly with the model of labor-management relations
Congress envisioned, in which unions and employers had distinct and conflicting interests. Congress did not perceive unions
and employers as sharing mutual and interdependent concerns,
as have Chrysler and the UAW. Rather, labor and management
were seen as antagonistic entities requiring legal separation and
protection from one another.

B.

The Manager as Employer

The adversarial model of employment relations under the Act
is further illustrated by the exclusion of those persons possessing
"managerial" authority from the ambit of the Act. Neither the
NLRA nor any of its amendments identified and excluded this
category of persons from the protections of the statute.87 Yet the
Board, very early, developed a policy of refusing to certify, as
also S. REP. No. 105, supra note 78, at 5 ("It is natural to expect that unless this Congress takes action, management will be deprived of the undivided loyalty of its foremen.
There is an inherent tendency to subordinate their interests wherever they conflict with
those of the rank and file.").
85. The NLRB, in furtherance of this philosophy, has excluded persons as supervisors solely upon a finding that they had authority to act as supervisors, even if that
authority is rarely if ever exercised. See, e.g., Hirsch Broadcasting Co., 116 N.L.R.B.
1780 (1956); Yamada Transfer, 115 N.L.R.B. 1330 (1956); United States Gypsum Co., 93
N.L.R.B. 91 (1951). See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 36-37 (1976).
86. As to this development, Professor Cox said:
The growth of foremen's unions unquestionably threatened a revolution in
management, for to perform its responsibilities effectively the employer requires
the foreman's undivided loyalty as its principal point of contact with the workers and such loyalty cannot be secured if the foremen are psychologically allied
with, or subject to the pressures of their union on behalf of, the rank and file.
Cox, supra note 9, at 5. As to the legal treatment of foremen's unions generally, see
Larrowe, A Meteor on the Industrial Relations Horizon: The Foremen's Association of
America, 2 LAB. HlsT. 259 (1961); Levinson, Foremen's Unions and the Law, 1950 Wis.
L. REV. 79.
87. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 275, 283,
288 (1974).
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inappropriate, bargaining units that included "managerial" employees together with rank-and-file employees. 88 This policy received endorsement during consideration of the Taft-Hartley
amendments; the legislative history suggests strongly that Congress agreed with the Board's policy of distinguishing between
"management" and employees. 89 Indeed, the distinction remained intact for over twenty years, as the Board, with unanimous approval from reviewing courts,90 continued to find all
managerial employees outside the purview of the Act. 91
In 1970, however, the Board modified its position,92 and in
1972, in Bell Aerospace Co., Division of Textron, Inc., 93 included buyers who were considered "management" in a bargaining unit with other employees. The employer refused to bargain,
contending that the unit was inappropriate because it contained
managerial employees. The Board rejected this objection and
sought enforcement of .its order to bargain, reasoning that only
those managerial employees whose duties encompassed labor relations would be susceptible to conflicts of interest. 94
88. See Ford Motor Co., 66 N.L.R.B. 1317, 1322 (1946) ("We have customarily excluded from bargaining units of rank and file workers executive employees who are in a
position to formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies.") (footnote omitted); see, e.g., Electric Controller & Mfg. Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 1242, 1246, modified, 70
N.L.R.B. 903 (1946); Vulcan Corp., 58 N.L.R.B. 733, 736 (1944); Spicer Mfg. Corp., 55
N.L.R.B. 1491, 1498 (1944); Julien P. Freiz & Sons, Div. of Bendix Aviation Corp., 47
N.L.R.B. 43, 47 (1943). See generally NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc.,
416 U.S. 267, 275-77 (1974).
89. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 283-84
(1974); R. GORMAN, supra note 85, at 37.
90. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 1151, 1158 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); NLRB v. North Ark. Elec. Coop., 412 F.2d 324 (8th Cir.
1969); Illinois State Journal-Register, Inc. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 37, 41 (7th Cir. 1969);
Continental Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 727, 730 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 902
(1969); Retail Clerks Int'! Ass'n v. NLRB, 366 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1017 (1967); International Ladies Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 339 F.2d
116, 123 (2d Cir. 1964).
91. See, e.g., Ed's Foodland of Springfield, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 1256, 1260 (1966); Albuquerque Div., ACF Indus., 145 N.L.R.B. 403, 418-19 (1963); Eastern Camera & Photo
Corp. 140 N.L.R.B. 569, 571 (1963); Temco Aircraft Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1085, 1089
(1958); Federal Tel. & Radio Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 1652, 1654 (1958); American Fed'n of
Labor, 120 N.L.R.B. 969, 971 (1958) (dictum); Swift & Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 752, 753-54
(1956); General Tel. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1225, 1229 (1955); Curtiss-Wright Corp., 103
N.L.R.B. 458, 464 (1953); Denver Dry Goods Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 1167, 1175 (1947).
92. See North Ark. Elec. Coop., 185 N.L.R.B. 550 (1970), enforcement denied, 446
F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1971).
93. 190 N.L.R.B. 431 (1971), enforcement denied, 475 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973), a/f'd
in part and reu'd in part, 416 U.S. 267 (1974).
94. Thus, the "fundamental touchstone" was "whether the duties and responsibilities
of any managerial employee . . . include determinations which should be made free of
any conflict of interest which could arise if the person involved was a participating member of a labor organization." 196 N.L.R.B. at 828.
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The Board's approach, then, signaled an easing of the strict
division between management and labor. By permitting certain
managers to organize, the Board no longer envisioned employee
organization as, by itself, antagonistic to employer inte~ests.
Though the Board's decision recognized circumstances under
which a manager who was also a union member might face a
conflict between goals of management and the union, those interests were not necessarily presumed to be broadly and inherently at odds.
The NLRB's easing of the division between labor and management, however, did not withstand judicial scrutiny. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied enforcement of
the Board's order, 911 and the Supreme Court sustained that reversal, concluding "that Congress intended to exclude from the
protections of the Act all employees properly classified as 'managerial' " 96 regardless of whether their duties include labor relations matters.
This broad exclusion of managers upon policy considerations
highlights the adversarial foundation of the NLRA in two important ways. First, it embodies the consistent and universal
view of the Board, the courts, and Congress that a division between management and labor inheres in national labor policy.
Second, though the Board would have excluded only those managerial employees susceptible to conflicts of interest - specifically, those employees exercising labor relations functions for
the employer - the Court required exclusion of those persons
deemed "closely aligned with management," irrespective of any
potential for actual conflict of interest. This approach separates
management from labor along status lines, and leads to the ineluctable inference that protected concerted activity and employee organization are, by their very nature, seen as antithetical
to the interests of management. As one result, the rules of the
contest have been drawn to place labor and management on separate, distinct, and opposing sides. In agreeing that Fraser
should play a role in directing the company, this is a vision
which the UAW and Chrysler have challenged.
95. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc., 475 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973).
96. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974) (emphasis added). Managerial employees were subsequently defined as "those who formulate
and effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of
their employer, and those who have discretion in the performance of their jobs independent of their employer's established policy." General Dynamics Corp., Convair Aerospace
Div., 213 N.L.R.B. 851, 857 (1974).
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Management as Labor's Adversary

Perhaps the most germane example of the strict division between the parties wrought by the Act has been the NLRB's persistent hostility toward activities of management in, or on behalf
of, labor organizations. 97 Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA makes it
an unfair labor practice for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it,"98 thereby ensuring representation of employees' interests undiluted by subtle
or overt influence from the employer. 99 It was aimed initially at
the employers who had established "company unions" to avoid
"true" or adversarial collective bargaining with employee-selected representatives - a phenomenon arising during the
1920's and 1930's as a response of employers to the emerging
influence of independent unions. 10° Congress, persuaded that
97. See generally Getman, The Midwest Piping Doctrine: An Example of the Need
for Reappraisal of Labor Board Dogma, 31 U. Cm. L. REV. 292 (1964); Note, section
8(a)(2): Employer Assistance to Plant Unions and Committees, 9 STAN. L. REV. 351
(1957); Note, New Standards for Domination and Support Under Section 8(a)(2), 82
YALE L.J. 510 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, New Standards].
·
98. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1976).
99. See International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 739
(1961) (section 8(a)(2) goes "far to assure freedom of choice and majority rule in employee selection of representatives"); NLRB v. Mt. Clemens Metal Products Co., 287
F.2d 790, 791 (6th Cir. 1961) ("The employer is under a duty to refrain from any action
which will place him on both sides of the bargaining table."); Hotpoint Div., General
Electric Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 788, 792 (1960).
100. See R. GORMAN, supra note 85, at 195; Crager, Company Unions Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 40 M1cH. L. REV. 831, 831-32 (1942). Passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 Stat. 195 (1933) (held unconstitutional 1935), and particularly § 7(a) of the Act, was later seen by Congress as having given impetus to employer-sponsored labor organizations. Congress perceived this as reflecting attempts to
avoid unionization - rather than as indicative of sincere attempts to foster employee
self-organization. Thus, Senator Wagner remarked that "[t]he company unions that have
come to my attention are dominated by the employer, and most of them were created as
soon as Section 7(a) [of the National Industrial Recovery Act) became a law, and in
order to circumvent the law." National Labor Relations Board: Hearings on S. 1958
Before the Senate Comm. on Education & Labor, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 263,
reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
1617, 1649 (1935). In 1935, employer-sponsored labor organizations accounted for more
than 2.5 million workers. C. SUMMERS & H. WELLINGTON, LABOR LAW 419-20 (1968). This
figure amounted to approximately one-fourth of all industrial employees. T. BROOKS,
TOIL AND TROUBLE 170 (1965). Of this development, a Senate Committee declared:
"Practically 70 percent of the employer-promoted unions have sprung up since the passage of section 7 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act. The testimony before the
committee has indicated that the active entry of some employers into a vigorous competitive race for the organization of workers is not conducive to peace in industry." S. REP.
No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11, reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 2300, 2310 (1935).
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company unions had great potential for undermining the labor
movement, invested the Board with broad powers under section
8(a)(2) to eradicate employer-supported organizations. Thus,
from its inception, the Board developed and vigorously enforced
a rule that maintained "a strict dichotomy between labor and
management. " 101 In essence, the NLRB adopted a per se approach to allegations of unlawful interference or domination
101. Note, New Standards, supra note 97, at 510-11; see, e.g., Ansin Shoe Mfg. Co., 1
N.L.R.B. 929, 935 (1936) (the statutory prohibition against management domination and
interference with labor ·organizations "must be broadly interpreted to cover any conduct
upon the part of an employer which is intended to bring into being, even indirectly, some
organization which he considers favorable to his interests").
The labor-management dichotomy has been made sweeping by the broad statutory
interpretation and a definition given the term "labor organization," defined in § 2(5) as
"any organization, of any kind ... in which employees participate and which exists for
the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment or conditions of work." 29 U.S.C. §
152(5) (1976). In interpreting this broad definition, the Supreme Court held in NLRB v.
Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. 203 (1959), that a committee organized by the employer to provide "a procedure for considering employees' ideas and problems of mutual interest to
the employees and management" was a labor organization within the meaning of§ 2(5).
The Court concluded that the statutory phrase "dealing with" went beyond mere "bargaining," and thus, because the committee discussed such matters as job classification,
holidays, vacations, and similar matters, the organization existed at least in part for the
purpose of "dealing with" the employer regarding terms and conditions of employment.
Id. at 210-13.
In keeping with this broad approach, the nature and degree of group activity required
to meet the statutory definition of a labor organization has not been substantial. Pursuant to the Cabot Carbon holding, the NLRB has found employee groupings to be labor
organizations where the group has no constitution or officers, General Dynamics Corp.,
213 N.L.R.B. 851 (1974); East Dayton Tool & Dye Co., 194 N.L.R.B. 266 (1971), bylaws,
Sweetwater Hospital Ass'n, 219 N.L.R.B. 803 (1975), or other formal structure, NLRB v.
Clapper's Mfg. Inc., 458 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 939 (1971). A group has been found to be a labor organization though it has not entered into a collective bargaining contract, Peggs Run Coal Co.
v. UMW Dist. 5, 475 F.2d 1396 (3d Cir. 1973); Arkay Packaging Corp., 221 N.L.R.B. 99
(1975), or ever bargained previously, Sweetwater Hospital Ass'n, 219 N.L.R.B. 803
(1975). Employee groups have been found to rise to the level of labor organizations even
though characterized by the employer as a "communications committee," NLRB v. Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 939 (1971), an "employees' committee or association," Eastern Indus., 217 N.L.R.B. 834 (1975); Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc., 132 N.L.R.B. 993 (1961), enforced as modified, 305 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1962),
an "oral suggestion box," NLRB v. Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 939 (1971), or a committee designed to open channels of communication and bring
the "monolithic corporation into relevant contact with its people," Arkay Packaging
Corp., 221 N.L.R.B. 99 (1975). So long as the employee group has dealt with management regarding working hours, overtime, lateness, absenteeism, see id., sanitary conditions, inadequate ventilation, desirability of additional fringe benefits, see NLRB v.
Clapper's Mfg., Inc., 458 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1972), aisle safety, or additional coffee, see
Rupp Indus., 217 N.L.R.B. 385 (1975), it has been found to fall within the statutory
meaning even if discussions range widely beyond traditional subjects of collective bargaining, see NLRB v. Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 939
(1971).
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whereby any employer involvement beyond a certain critical
level would be found violative of the Act. 102
This approach has been eroded to some extent, however, by
various appellate court rulings refusing enforcement of Board
orders to dissolve employer-supported organizations. 103 More
than the Board, these courts have attempted to distinguish employer domination or interference from cooperative efforts
designed to enhance labor-management relations. 10" Under this
view, establishment of a section 8(a)(2) violation requires a
showing of actual domination or interference, not merely hypothetical employer overreaching. 106 The courts will consider fac102. See Note, New Standards, supra note 97, at 511-14. Thus, in its first published
decision, the Board found that a "union" formed during an organizing drive to handle
employee grievances violated § 8(a)(2). Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 1 N.L.R.B. 1
(1935), enforced, 303 U.S. 261 (1938). Under the Board's traditional interpretation of §
8(a)(2), for instance, employer-supported organizations could not be salvaged by a showing that the employer had beneficent motives, see NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding
& Drydock Co., 308 U.S. 241 (1939), or that the employees were satisfied with the organization, see St. Joseph Lead Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 541, 544-45 (1968); see also Feldman &
Steinberg, Employee-Management Committees and the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947, 35 TuL. L. REV. 365, 366 (1961) ("A long line of court [and Board] decisions
... has stricken down, with apparent mechanical regularity, a succession of plans
whereby employers have sought to establish employee-management committees to adjust
the multitude of day-to-day shop grievances."). For an early account of the treatment of
company-sponsored employee groups, see Crager, supra note 100.
103. See generally Note, New Standards, supra note 97, at 519-25.
104. This departure from the Board's per se rule likely reflected a growing awareness
that § 8(a)(2), in its extreme form, addressed a problem - the company union - which
no longer existed. As early as 1947, then-Board Chairman Herzog observed that
"[w]hatever reasons may once have existed for directing disestablishment in every case
in which a violation of section 8 (2) was found, [he doubted] whether that remedy [was)
invariably necessary ... [because between 1935 and 1947] employees ha[d) learned
much about protecting their own rights and making their own choices with the full facts
before them." Detroit Edison Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 267, 279 (1947). In 1953, he declared the
company union problem to be "almost dead." Labor-Management Relations, 1953:
Hearings on H. Res. 115 Before the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 83d Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 266 (1953) (remarks of NLRB Chairman Herzog). Furthermore, in
1972, one commentator excoriated the Board's approach as the reflection of outdated
assumptions:
Only in light of labor's struggle against the early company unions is the per se
rule intelligible. Standing alone, it is not entirely logical; outright employer assistance by itself need be neither detrimental nor improper . . . . The per se prohibition on such assistance is understandable only when coupled with the assumption that employer assistance to labor organizations is necessarily subversive to
the interests of the employees.
Note, New Standards, supra note 97, at 515; see also id. at 515-25 (calling for a limited
redefinition of the approach to § 8(a)(2), not only because the threat of company unionism has declined, but also because employees themselves have disavowed class struggle
pt:>litics and adversarial relationships with management).
i05. See, e.g., NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208 (1st Cir. 1979); FederalMogul Corp. v. NLRB, 394 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1968); Modern Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379
F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Prince Macaroni Mfg. Co., 329 F.2d 803 (1st Cir.
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tors such as whether improper employer intent was involved in
the providing of assistance to the employee group, 106 whether
other coercive activities accompanied the employer support,107
and whether employees were precluded from selecting a different, independent representative. 108 In Hertzka & Knowles v.
NLRB, 109 a case exemplifying the disagreement with the Board's
per se approach, the court distilled these factors into a requirement that a section 8(a)(2) violation "rest on a showing that the
employees' free choice ... is stifled by the degree of employer
involvement at issue." 11 ° Finding no evidence of anti-union animus or employee dissatisfaction, the court denied enforcement
of the Board's order to dissolve employee committees that included management representatives. Expressing sentiments
clearly applicable to the collaborative efforts undertaken by
Chrysler and the UAW, the court observed that "[f]or us to condemn this organization would mark approval of a purely adversarial model of labor relations. Where a cooperative arrangement
reflects a choice freely arrived at and where the organization is
capable of being a meaningful avenue for the expression of employee wishes, we find it unobjectionable under the Act. " l l l
Despite these judicial initiatives, the NLRB has largely persisted in its more inflexible interpretation of the scope of section
8(a)(2). 112 Thus, the Board, through its unyielding condemnation
1964).
106. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
939 (1971); NLRB v. Newman-Green, Inc., 401 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1968); Chicago Rawhide
Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955).
107. See, e.g., NLRB v. Keller Ladders Southern, Inc., 405 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1968);
Coppus Eng'g Corp. v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1957).
108. See, e.g., NLRB v. Clegg, 304 F.2d 168 (8th Cir. 1962); Coppus Eng'g Corp. v.
NLRB, 240 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1957); cf. Hotpoint Co. v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 683 (7th Cir.
1961) (employee council had a right independent of employer to make and amend putatively restrictive union bylaws).
109. 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974).
110. Id. at 630.
111. Id. at 631.
112. More recent Board decisions have found impermissible interference or domination where employees voted for an employer-assisted committee as an alternative to representation by an international union, e.g., Victor M. Sprys, 217 N.L.R.B. 712 (1975),
and where representatives to an employer-assisted group had been freely elected by employees in the employer's various departments, e.g., Arkay Packaging Corp., 221
N.L.R.B. 99 (1975); Rupp Indus., 217 N.L.R.B. 385 (1975). Violations of§ 8(a)(2) have
been declared as well when groups were formed or assisted by the employer during an
organizing campaign, e.g., Utrad Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 434 (1970), enforced as modified,
454 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1971); Victor M. Sprys, 217 N.L.R.B. 712 (1975), even in the total
absence of concurrent organizing activities, e.g., Rennselaer Polytechnic Inst., 219
N.L.R.B. 712 (1975); Versatube Corp., 203 N.L.R.B. 456 (1973), enforced, 492 F.2d 795
(6th Cir. 1974). Board decisions have found employer's actions violative of the Act when
they involved conducting meetings on the employer's premises, e.g., Utrad Corp., 185
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of employer assistance to employee groups, has viewed the Act
as embodying a "purely adversarial model of labor relations." In
contrast, many courts 113 concur with Chrysler and the UAW
that, under certain circumstances, cooperation and mutual assistance can be salutary rather than necessarily injurious to employee interests. m
N.L.R.B. 434 (1970), enforced as modified, 454 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1971), controlling the
composition of the representative body, e.g., Rennselaer Polytechnic Inst., 219 N.L.R.B.
712 (1975), participating through supervisors or other agents attending employee meetings, e.g., id.; Utrad Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 434 (1970), enforced as modified, 454 F.2d 520
(7th Cir. 1971), providing compensated time during working hours for employee meetings, e.g., id., supplying clerical services or stationery, e.g., Thompson Ramo Wooldridge,
Inc., 132 N.L.R.B. 993 (1961), enforced as modified, 305 F.2d 807 (1962), or assisting
with legal services, e.g., Versatube Corp., 203 N.L.R.B. 456 (1973), enforced, 492 F.2d 795
(6th Cir. 1974).
113. See supra notes 103-111 and accompanying text; see also NLRB v. Magic
Slacks, Inc., 314 F.2d 844 (7th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Post Publishing, 311 F.2d 565 (7th
Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Valentine Sugars, Inc., 211 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1954).
114. Other experiments with cooperative labor relations have met with mixed judicial
treatment as a result of the adversarial assumptions implicit in the NLRA. Nevertheless,
employers and unions have recently engaged in a great deal of experimentation with
employee groupings working on a cooperative basis. Inspired .by the success of Japanese
manufacturers in using a consensus approach to labor-management relations, see generally R. CoLE, WORK, MOBILITY, AND PARTICIPATION (1979); W. Oucm, THEORY Z: How
AMERICAN BUSINESS CAN MEET THE JAPANESE CHALLENGE (1981); E. VOGEL, JAPAN AS
NUMBER ONE (1979); How Japan Does It, TIME, Mar. 30, 1981, at 54, these experiments
- termed quality circles or quality-of-work-life programs - are occurring across a range
of domestic industries., It has been estimated that some 750 employers - including
Lockheed, Polaroid, Dana, TRW, Procter & Gamble, Herman Miller, and Northrop are introducing such programs. Burck, What Happens When Workers Manage Themselves, FORTUNE, July 27, 1981, at 62. Moreover, major unions - including the UAW, the
United Steelworkers of America, the Communication Workers of America, and the International Brotherhood of Electrical & Telecommunications International Union - have
signed national labor agreements containing commitments to q·uality-of-work-life programs. Burck, What's In It For The Unions, FORTUNE, Aug. 24, 1981, at 88; At G.M. 's
Buick Unit, Workers and Bosses Get Ahead by Getting Along, N.Y. Times, "uly 5, 1981,
§ 3, at 4, col. 3; A Search for Quality: Detroit Tries It All, Wash. Post, Aug. 23, 1981, at
GI, col. 1. While the election of Fraser constitutes an experiment with nonadversarial
labor-management relations at the highest level of corporate governance, these innovations may be viewed as cooperative efforts at the opposite end of the enterprise.
Comprehensive treatment of the quality-of-work-life experiments must await another
day; nonetheless, some preliminary observations can be made. It has generally been assumed, in keeping with the broad definition of a "labor organization" enunciated in
NLRB v. Cabot Carbon, 360 U.S. 203 (1959); see supra note 77, that employer involvement in such programs would be violative of the NLRA. "Assessed in terms of [the]
specific prohibitions [against employer assistance) ... , the [production] team is clearly
a dominated and supported labor organization." Note, Does Employer Implementation
of Employee Production Teams Violate Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations
Act?, 49 IND. L.J. 516, 531 (1974); see Murmann, The Scanlon Plan Joint Committee
and Section 8(a)(2), 31 LAB. L.J. 299 (1980). Despite this well-established doctrine, the
Board has revealed some greater degree of tolerance for nonadversarial employee groupings. See General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977); Mercy-Memorial Hospital
Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1977); Sparks-Nugget, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 275 (1977). Significantly, however, these decisions have been based not upon a distinction between em-
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VARIATIONS ON THE THEME: THE BOARD'S TREATMENT OF
DEVIATIONS FROM TRADITIONAL ROLES OF LABOR AND
MANAGEMENT

In light of the adversarial model of labor-management relations envisioned by the NLRA, it might well be asked whether
and to what extent the law will accommodate deviations - such
as Fraser's recent elevation to the Chrysler Board - from the
traditional roles taken by labor and management. Specifically,
under what circumstances will a representative of an employer
or employees be permitted to adopt a dual role, engaging in activities on behalf of both labor and management?
Examination of NLRB decisions reveals several touchstones
for evaluating such conflict-of-interest questions. First, Board
conflict-of-interest doctrine has centered upon the potential
harm inflicted upon employee interests by conflicts arising from
abuses of position; essentially, the Board seeks to protect employee interests rather than those of the employer or competitors. 1111 Second, the Board maintains a behavioral assumption
that representatives do not alter their allegiances when performing functions for the other side. 116 Management representatives
in unions, then, are presumed to remain loyal to management,
a:pd union representatives involved in management affairs likewise are presumed to remain loyal to the union. With these perspectives in mind, a consistent approach can be derived from the
cases reviewing the legality of dual roles for union or management representatives.
A.

Employers Involved in Union A/fairs

On its face, the NLRA gives employees complete freedom in
player "interference" and "cooperation," but rather upon a limitation of the breadth of
the definition of a "labor organization" under § 2(5). Thus, the Board's tolerance of these
nonadversarial undertakings does not reflect any deviation from its presumption that an
employer's purpose in assisting a labor organization is to subvert the actual interests of
employees.
115. Thus, in Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1555 (1954), where the
union owned a company that competed directly with the employer, the Board disqualified the union not because of a threat to the employer, but rather because of the potential that the union might protect its investment by less vigorously representing the employees. See id. at 1559-60; see also Nassau & Suffolk Contractors' Ass'n, 118 N.L.R.B.
174, 185 (1957) ("Congress has not seen fit to make it an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization to dominate or interfere with the administration of an employer's business").
116. See infra text accompanying notes 122-29.
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their choice of representatives. Section 7 gives employees the
right "to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing." 117 Section 9(c)(l)(A) provides for the filing of a
representation petition by "any individual" acting on behalf of
employees, 118 and section 2(4) defines the term "representative"
as including "any individual." 119 Nevertheless, as a matter of
policy, the Board has held, for example, that a supervisor may
not represent the employees of his employer for collective bargaining purposes, notwithstanding that the employees freely selected him as their representative. 120 Indeed, the NLRB has not
wavered in its condemnation of any substantial involvement by
employer representatives in internal union affairs. 121 Thus, in
Columbia Pictures Corp., 122 the Board refused to process a representation petition where supervisors had participated in the
formation of the union. Similarly, in Nassau & Suffolk Contractors' Association, Inc., 123 where two of the twelve members of
the union's negotiating team were supervisors, the Board found
a violation of section 8(a)(2), observing that it was "improper for
supervisors, even those with predominantly union loyalty, to
serve as negotiating representatives of employees. " 124
Consistent with this reasoning, where a supervisor of the employer served also as union steward, the Board found an impermissible intermingling of supervisory and employee-representative functions which deprived the employees of their right to be
represented in collective bargaining matters by individuals having "single-minded loyalty to their interest." 1211 More significantly, in Employing Bricklayers' Association, 128 the Board
117. 29 u.s.c. § 157 (1976).
118. Id. § 159(c)(l)(A).
119. Id. § 152(4).
120. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1555 (1954). The authority to disqualify bargaining representatives was established in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 331 U.S. 416, 422 (1937), where the Supreme Court made clear the Board's "discretion to place appropriate limitations on the choice of bargaining representatives
should it find that public or statutory policies so dictate."
121. See generally supra pt. III C.
122. 94 N.L.R.B. 466 (1951).
123. 118 N.L.R.B. 174 (1957).
124. Id. at 187. The Board reasoned:
Employees have the right to be represented in collective-bargaining negotiations
by individuals who have a single-minded loyalty to their interests. Conversely,
an employer is under duty to refrain from any action which will interfere with
that employee right and place him in slight degree on both sides of the bargaining table.
Id;' accord St. Louis Labor Health Inst., 230 N.L.R.B. 180 (1977).
125. E.E.E. Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 982, 982 (1968).
126. 134 N.L.R.B. 1535 (1961).
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found a section 8(a)(2) violation where the employer's executive
secretary merely voted for delegates to the union's international
convention. The employer contended that its involvement was
related only tangentially to the representation process, but the
Board dismissed this argument by asserting that very few matters within the concern of unions are unrelated to the representation process. That the management official was a union member and may well have been acting in the perceived best interest
of the union was deemed irrelevant because, in the Board's view,
participation in such union affairs should be reserved for "union
members who have no divided loyalties."127 Here, the manager's
vote represented "the judgment of a person with dual loyalties,
which are not always easily reconcilable." 128
Therefore, where a representative of management also undertakes duties on behalf of the union, thus assuming a dual role,
such action will be condemned though the duties be far removed
from collective bargaining and though no actual wrongdoing be
established. The manager is presumed loyal to management, and
the Board position guards against the mere potential for undermining employees' interests. 129 As a result, were Fraser considered a management representative - a tenable position, given
the important role he plays in the governance of Chrysler - his
continued active involvement in the union would be proscribed.
In fact, however, the view that a labor representative such as
Fraser could become one with management has not prevailed in
NLRB decisions addressing the elevation of union officials to
corporate governing boards.

B.

Union Representation on Corporate Boards Under the
NLRA

While Fraser sits as one of twenty members of Chrysler's
board of directors, he serves also as the union's chief spokesman
during contract negotiations with Chrysler and the other major
127. Id. at 1537.
128. Id.; see G & H Towing Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 589, 590, 596-97 (1967); Powers Reg\1lator Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 1185, 1188 (1964), enforced, 355 F.2d 506 (7th Cir. 1966);
Bottfield-Refractories Co., 127 N.L.R.B. 188 (1960), sub nom. NLRB v. Employing
Bricklayers' Ass'n, 292 F.2d 627 (3d. Cir. 1961); Nassau & Suffolk Contractors' Ass'n, 118
N.L.R.B. 174, 183 (1957).
129. Under certain circumstances, the Board has permitted some erosion of this principle. In the construction industry, for example, where skilled supervisors might move
from a unit position into supervision and back again, the Board has allowed low-level
supervisors to be included in the bargaining unit. See, e.g., Nassau & Suffolk Contractors' Ass'n, Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 174 (1957).
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automobile manufacturers. He remains actively involved in developing and defining the UAW's collective bargaining stance, in
modifying positions taken during negotiations, and in determining whether contract proposals should be accepted. 130 Although
not a daily participant in negotiations, he does, on occasion, attend such sessions on behalf of the union.
In addition to these UAW duties, Fraser as a member of the
Chrysler Board votes upon a wide range of issues confronting
the corporation. His involvement on the Board does not extend
to corporate debates regarding bargaining strategy with the
UAW, but otherwise he "participate[s] fully in deliberations on
all other matters, ... including ... collective bargaining policies and other worker concerns, such as health and safety, plant
closings and transfers, new technology, product planning, major
investments and equal employment opportunities and
practices. " 131
Such activities of an employee representative acting as corporate decisionmaker likely will be scrutinized for a variety of potential conflicts of interest. Perhaps the best example is the employee representative who participates, as does Fraser, in
decisions regarding plant relocation or closure, subcontracting of
unit work, adoption of labor-saving devices, or other matters
which have immediate effects upon jobs or job be~efits. If the
director accepts such policy changes in these matters, claims
from adversely affected employees are likely to follow; if the director resists such developments, questions regarding the director's duty to shareholders become apparent. 18ll
130. NLRB Advice Memorandum, Case No. 7-CB-4815, 1980-81 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 11
20,269, at 33,476 (Oct. 22, 1980).
131. CHRYSLER CORP., NOTICE 01' ANNUAL MEETING 01' STOCKHOLDERS AND PRoxv
STATEMENT 10 (May 13, 1980) (state~ent of Douglas A. Fraser).
132. Questions about Fraser's fiduciary duties to shareholders, as distinct from his
obligations to UAW members, while beyond the scope of this Article, are far from settled. There is a division of authority regarding whether a corporate officer's fiduciary
duty runs to the corporation as an entity, or to the shareholders themselves. Compare 15
PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1408 (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982) (director's duty runs to the corporation), with N."C. GEN. STAT. § 55-35 (1975) (duty runs both to corporation and to
shareholders). The weight of authority, however, holds that a director's duty runs to the
corporation. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 221-26 (1939); H. HENN, HANDBOOK or THE LAw or CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusiNESS ENTERPRISES § 238 (2d ed. 1971). As a result, a majority of courts will not void a
board decision that is fair and reasonable to the corporation, merely because a director
with an outside interest participated in making the decision. See Pepper v. Litton, 308
U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 405,
241 P.2d 66 (1952); Fill Bldgs., Inc. v. Alexander Hamilton Life Ins. Co., 396 Mich. 453,
· 241 N.W.2d 466 (1976); see also MODEL BUSINESS CoRP. ACT § 41 (1979). See generally
Note, supra note 6, at 652-60.
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Based upon the limited, adversarial model of labor-management relations embodied in Board law, a wide range of activities
by management representatives in union affairs is proscribed. 188
Because the Act seeks to protect the interests of employees, m
the parallel question arises whether a parti~ipatory role for labor
representatives in business decisionmaking, by itself, tends to
undermine the interests of employees. Put another way, does the
law . require that union officials, like Caesar's wife, be above
suspicion?
In light of the traditional model of labor-management relations, the instances in which union representation on corporate
governing boards have been challenged are understandably few.
This has led some to presume mistakenly that such actions
would be assessed under the same standards as are applied to
determining the propriety of management activities on behalf of
unions. 181 Though the Board has passed upon the question only
a few times, and by its own admission has yet to articulate a test
broadly applicable to such questions, 188 case law does reveal that
union officials such as Fraser will be liberally permitted to serve
upon the governing boards of enterprises employing their members; while simultaneously retaining their representative status
- unless union representatives comprise a majority of the corporate board, or unless the union has a direct financial interest
in the company. 187
The NLRA contains no specific prohibition against union activities in corporate governance or management, 188 but the
Board nonetheless possesses undisputed authority to disqualify
persons from acting as employee representatives based upon
133. See supra pt. IV A.
134. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
135. See Murphy, Workers on the Board: BGrrowing a European Idea, 27 LAB. L.J.
751, 753-54 (1976); Comment, supra note 8, at 969-70. The argument runs that a union
officer serving as corporate director could be viewed as a supervisor engaging in important union affairs, thus violating § 8(a)(2). A variant on this approach would find union
representation on a corporate board violative of § 8(a)(2) whenever an employer initiated
and implemented the plan. See Note, The West German Model of Codetermination
Under Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 51 IND. L.J. 795, 812 (1976). These analyses,
though, seemingly give short shrift to NLRB decisions approaching the question as one
of conflict of interest, where the union representative is presumed to remain loyal to
member-employees despite involvement with the corporate board; see infra notes 141-45
and accompanying text.
136. See NLRB Advice Memorandum, Case No. 7-CB-4815, 1980-81 NLRB Dec.
(CCH) ,r 20,269, at 33,476 (Oct. 22, 1980).
137. See NLRB v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 621 F.2d 1322, 1326-27 (6th Cir. 1980); Sierra
Vista Hospital, Inc., 241 N.L.R.B. 631, 633-34 (1979).
138. See Nassau & Suffolk Contractors' Ass'n, 118 N.L.R.B. 174, 185 (1957).
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conflict-of-interest considerations. 139 The NLRB has seldom exercised this discretion, however, in the face of the cardinal policy
of freedom of selection of representatives. Ho This reflects the
Board's apparent conclusion that union participation in corporate governance does not, by itself, work to the detriment of employees; union officials engaged in activities on behalf of management are assumed to remain loyal to the union, 141 thus
posing no threat to employees' interests.
In Anchorage Community Hospital, Inc., 141 for example,
union representatives sat both on the employer's board of trustees and on the executive management committee that reviewed
and approved the governing labor contract. Indeed, of the fifteen
trustees who comprised the board, seven were also union representatives. Emphasizing that the union representatives still constituted a minority of the board, the NLRB held that in the absence of evidence that the union had, in fact, sacrificed the
employee's interests to advance those of the employer, the presence of union representatives on the employer's governing board
would not be violative of the Act.Ha Similarly, in Child Day
Care Center,H• a union whose local represented the employees
of a child day-care center also appointed half of the members of
the board of trustees that administered funds for the day-care
center. Moreover, the chairman of the board of trustees was
himself a union official. Nevertheless, the NLRB found that
these intertwined relationships among labor and management
did not preclude the union's representation of the day-care
center employees, because union officials did not represent a majority on the board of trustees, and no other factors suggested
that the union could not "approach negotiations with the singleminded _purpose of protecting and advocating the interests of
139. See sup.ra note 120.
140. See NLRB v. David Buttrick Co., 399 F.2d 505, 507 (1st Cir. 1968) ("There is a
strong public policy favoring the free choice of a bargaining agent by employees. The
choice is not lightly to be frustrated.").
141. Fraser has repeatedly emphasized that he intends to represent the interests of
employees while serving as a corporate director. See, e.g., The Risk in Putting a Union
Chief on the Board, Bus. WK., May 19, 1980, at 149; Lett, Fraser to Quit at Chrysler,
Detroit News, Apr. 13, 1982, at 1, col. 6 (Responding to speculation that he might stay on
as a corporate director after retiring from the presidency of the UAW, Fraser observed,
"I think that sort of runs counter to why I'm there in the first place - as a representative of the workers."); Simison, UAW's Fraser to Speak Out for Labor, Public in Role as
Director at Chrysler, Wall St. J., Oct. 29, 1979, at 6, col. 2.
142. 225 N.L.R.B. 575 (1976).
143. Id. at 575.
144. 242 N.L.R.B. 1177 (1980).
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employees. " 145
Once union representatives constitute a majority of the employer's governing body, however, a different perspective
prevails. At this point, the Board seemingly considers the presumption of continuing loyalty to be inapplicable. In the rare
event where union officials have garnered a majority on the employer's board of directors, the NLRB has concluded that the
union no longer can advocate effectively the interests of employees. 146 In Centerville Clinics, Inc., 147 for instance, the Board
found a section 8(a)(2) violation where 112 members of the employer's 114-member board of directors were union officials.
Aside from union domination of the employer's governing
body, the other factor that triggers reversal of the presumption
of continuing loyalty is a union's direct, substantial pecuniary
interest in the company whose employees it represents. 148 Such a
financial interest, especially when combined with union involve145. Id.; cf. UMW Welfare & Retirement Fund, 192 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1971) (violation
of § 8(a)(2) found where supervisors actually participated in the daily activities of the
local union).
146. Questions regarding the lawfulness of a union's continuing representation likely
will arise in situations where employees purchase a plant from the employer pursuant to
an employee stock option plan or other similar arrangement. See generally Granados,
Employee Stock Option Plans: An Analysis of Current Reform Proposals, 14 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 15 (1980); Note, Employee Stock Ownership Plans: A Step Toward Democratic Capitalism, 55 B.U.L. REV. 195 (1975). If, under these circumstances, union representatives take a majority of positions on the corporate board, the union's continued
representation of the employees likely would be voidable; in this event, the Board apparently considers that the employees have effectively become the employer. See, e.g., supra
note 24 (describing employees' decision to purchase a majority share in the Rath Packing
Company, which in turn led to a union majority on the 16-member corporate board).
Such sales to employees have occurred in the automobile industry. In November 1981,
for instance, General Motors sold its Clark, New Jersey, Hyatt roller-hearing plant to
employees. The Disaster in Detroit, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 9, 1981, at 66. Proposals to sell
Ford Motor Company plants in Sheffield, Alabama, and Northville, Michigan, were unsuccessful when sale terms could not be reached. Detroit Free Press, Mar. 18, 1981, at
IA, col. 2; Detroit Free Press, Nov. 24, 1981, at IA, col. 2. Such developments may well
be on the increase. See Woodworth, supra note 24, at A27, col. I ("With an alarming
increase in the incidence of plant closings . . . conversion to worker ownership may become an important strategy for economic survival for the decades ahead.").
147. 181 N.L.R.B. 135 (1970).
148. A few cases have recognized that a disqualifying conflict of interest can arise as
well where a union has a financial stake in a competitor of the employer. See, e.g., NLRB
v. H.P. Hood, Inc., 496 F.2d 515 (1st Cir. 1974) (loan made from the union's pension
fund to a competitor of the employer); NLRB v. David Buttrick Co., 399 F.2d 505 (1st
Cir. 1968) (same); Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1555 (1954) (union owned a
direct competitor of the employer). Such an interest could cause the union to pursue
policies in derogation of the interests of both the employer and employees. See generally
Note, Confiict of Interest Problems Arising From Union Pension Fund Loans, 67
CoLUM. L. REV. 162 (1967); Note, Union Investment in Business: A Source of Union
Conflicts of Interest, 46 MINN. L. REV. 573 (1962).
·
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ment in managing the employer's operations, may place the
union in the untenable position of deciding between the interests of its constituents and the furtherance of its investments thereby creating a disqualifying conflict of interest under the
Act. Thus, in both Centerville Clinics and Medical Foundation
of Bellaire, 149 an important factor contributing to the finding of
violations was the financial dependency of the employer upon
the union, in addition to the substantial union representation on
the employer's governing board. 160
The twin elements that could cause union involvement in corporate management to be considered violative of the NLRA
manifestly are not presented by Fraser's election to the Chrysler
Board. Fraser is distinctly a minority voice on the Board; in contrast to Anchorage Community Hospital, Inc., 1111 where a
fifteen-member board having seven union representatives did
not violate the Act, labor occupies only one position on
Chrysler's twenty-member Board. 1611 Furthermore, the union
does not have a financial interest in Chrysler that could create a
disqualifying conflict of interest. Although the UAW clearly has
an interest in Chrysler's prosperity, this is no more a financial
stake than any employees have in the success of their employer,
and does not pose the threat that the union would subjugate the
interests of the workers to advance its own concerns. 1118
149.

193 N.L.R.B. 62 (1971).

150. In these decisions, the Board has identified the pecuniary ties between union
and employer that support its finding of a conflict of interest, without delving into the
question whether certain levels of financial involvement alone would be sufficient to establish a disqualifying conflict. In Anchorage Community Hospital, 225 N.L.R.B. 575
(1976), the Board suggested that a conflict of interest would be engendered only if the
employer had a substantial financial dependency upon the union. Although the union
had made construction loans to the employer, this financial involvement was "not sufficiently large to present a danger that Respondent Union would subvert the bargaining
rights of the unit employees," id. at 575; cf. NLRB v. David Buttrick Co., 399 F.2d 505
(1st Cir. 1968) (a disqualifying conflict was not established where the union made a substantial loan to a competitor of the employer, because the union did not have an "equitylike interest" in the competitor and therefore had no incentive to manipulate the interests of the employer and employees).
151. 225 N.L.R.B. 575 (1976); see supra text accompanying note 142.
152. See NLRB Advice Memorandum, Case No. 7-CB-4815, 1980-81 NLRB Dec.
(CCH) 11 20,269, at 33,478 (Oct. 22, 1980) ("the Union, in the person of Fraser, holds only
one position on the Board of Directors out of 20, clearly not such a significant number as
would present a conflict of interest.").
153. The UAW does not "wish to see Chrylser [sic] flourish at the expense of the
employees"; rather, "the Union's only interest in the financial state of Chrysler is to
insure maximum jobs and benefits for the employees." See id.
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Third-Party Employers

The conflict of interest questions raised by Fraser's election to
the Chrysler Board are made more complex by the UA W's representation of the employees of Chrysler's domestic competitors.164 Regardless of the position adopted by the UAW in negotiations with any one automobile manufacturer, doubts may
arise concerning the propriety of the union's approach. Thus,
should the UAW grant concessions to Chrysler, 105 employees of
General Motors, Ford, and American Motors may well perceive
their long-term interests being sacrificed for those of Chrysler
and its employees. Indeed, this conflict already is more than
conjectural. A recent study indicates that Chrysler, by virtue of
wage and benefit compromises made by the UAW, will save several hundred dollars on every car produced. 1118 Though Chrysler
might argue that these concessions merely redress its economy
of scale disadvantages, employees at competing auto manufacturers could legitimately view these cost savings as a threat to
their job security and the profitability of their employers - and
ultimately to their future wages and fringe benefits. 1117 In turn,
solicitude for the interests of the employees of other domestic
manufacturers conceivably could cause Fraser to alter his approach in representing the Chrysler workers.
In decisions addressing conflicts of interest arising from thirdparty considerations, however, the Board has been even less willing than with cases involving dual roles for union representatives
to find a disqualifying conflict of interest. Again, this reluctance
154. This combination of relationships is not likely to be limited to the UAW and the
automobile manufacturers. If, as some believe, a precondition to union participation on
employers' governing boards is the financial debility of the employer, see supra note 24
and accompanying text, such ventures can be expected in the large, manufacturing sectors of the economy, such as steel and rubber, which have suffered declining market
shares over the past decade. Cf. supra note 4 (discussing ventures in the airline industry). Because these sectors are characterized by large, industry-wide unions, it is probable that placement of a union representative on any one corporate board will create potential conflict of interest problems with competitors, see supra note 4 (discussing the
unwillingness of the Justice Department to approve appointment of a UAW representative to the American Motors Board following the Chrysler-UAW undertaking).
155. See, e.g., NLRB Advice Memorandum, Case No. 7-CB-4815, 1980-81 NLRB
Dec. (CCH) ,r 20,269, at 33,478 n.1 (in return for Fraser's election to the Chrysler Board,
the UAW collective bargaining agreement with Chrysler called for wage increases $203
million less than provided for in earlier packages negotiated with General Motors and
Ford).
156. Detroit Free Press, Feb. 1, 1981, at IA, col. 5.
157. Cf. Wall St. J., Nov. 11, 1979, at 4, col. 1 (allegations by the Chairman of General Motors that Fraser's directorship would create fundamental conflicts of interest
which could upset future labor negotiations).
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is grounded in the overriding desire to avoid intrusions into employees' freedom to select their bargaining representatives. 1118
In the leading case of Sierra Vista Hospital, Inc., 1119 the Board
set forth its approach to situations presenting potential conflicts
of interest resulting from union allegiances to third parties.
Where a supervisor of a third-party employer participated actively in internal union affairs, the Board recognized the possibility that this could "impinge" upon the employees' right to a
bargaining representative whose undivided concern is for their
interests." 160 Nonetheless, the Board concluded, mere involvement of third-party employers in the union would not itself be
sufficient to disqualify a bargaining representative; in the absence of "a showing that danger of a conflict of interest interfering with the collective bargaining process is clear and present,"
there would be no impermissible conflict. 181
Under this approach, Fraser's allegiances with Chrysler would
not be considered sufficient to create a conflict of interest disqualifying him from representing the employees of competing
domestic auto manufacturers. The NLRB does not consider it
significant that Fraser's objective of ensuring the solvency of
Chrysler, when serving as a member of the corporate board or
when representing the Chrysler workers, might make it more
difficult for him to approach negotiations with Chrysler's competitors with a single-minded desire to advance the interests of
their employees. The Board would require hard evidence, not
merely conjecture, before finding that Fraser's third-party ties
created a "clear and present danger" of an impermissible conflict of interest. 162 Thus, the NLRA, although conceived and ad158. See supra note 106.
159. 241 N.L.R.B. 631 (1979).
160. Id. at 633.
161. Id. (quoting NLRB v. David Buttrick Co., 399 F.2d 505, 507 (1st Cir. 1968)). In
cases subsequent to Sierra Vista, the Board has rejected allegations of disqualifying conflicts of interest arising from third-party entanglements where supervisors of competitors
were involved in union affairs, including high executive positions, but did not engage in
the actual collective-bargaining process. See, e.g., Lodi Memorial Hospital Ass'n, Inc.,
249 N.L.R.B. 786 (1980); Baptist Hospitals, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 170 (1979).
Only intimate alliances between the union and third-party interests have been held
sufficient to create a disqualifying conflict. See, e.g., Welfare & Pension Funds, 178
N.L.R.B. 14 (1969) (local bargaining unit had "direct and immediate allegiances" to a
parent union); General Teamsters, Local 249, 139 N.L.R.B. 605 (1962) (both the employer and the local unit were members of the same federation of local unions); Oregon
Teamsters' Security Plan Office, 119 N.L.R.B. 207 (1957) (union attempted to represent
its own employees); see also Bausch & Lomb Opti~ Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1555 (1954)
(union owned a direct competitor of the employer, and thus was in the position of choosing between furthering its investment and representing the unit employees).
162. See NLRB Advice Memorandum, Case No. 7-CB-4815, 1980-81 NLRB Dec.

Journal of Law Reform

254

[VOL. 15:2

ministered on the assumptions that comprise a limited, adversarial model of labor-management relations, will not prevent the
Chrysler-UAW departure from that model.
V.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE DEPARTURE

Whether this new-found marriage between labor and management will become a key to Chrysler's financial recovery remains
to be seen. Furthermore, only time will tell whether such a cooperative venture, like other innovations born in the automobile
industry, will become a widely accepted union practice.
Whatever the benefits of this venture, however, the Board's liberal acceptance of union involvement in management activities
poses serious implications, particularly for disaffected individual
member-employees.
A. - The Presumption of Loyalty

The Board's conflict of interest decisions reveal a presumption
that union representatives engaged in corporate decisionmaking
remain faithful to the interests of employees. 188 In fact, though,
considerable evidence from the social sciences suggests that this
presumption may be seriously misplaced. 184 Furthermore, at
(CCH) 11 20,269, at 33,477 (Oct. 22, 1980) ("Although it ia conceivable that the Union
would take 'harsh' positions in bargaining with other auto manufacturers for the purpose
of injuring them and benefiting Chrysler, there is no evidence to indicate that the Union
or Fraser has done that or plans to do that.").
163. See supra note 141.
164. "[T]he members of any enduring group are likely to display a striking homogeneity of beliefs, attitudes, values, and behavior." GROUP DYNAMICS 139 (D. Cartwright &
A. Zander 3d ed. 1968). While the strength and effectiveness of forces toward uniformity
depend upon many variables, there is no longer any question that groups exert influences
which can and do result in conforming opinions and behavior patterns. See L. F'EsTINGER, S. SCHACTER & K. BACK, SOCIAL PRESSURES IN INFORMAL GROUPS 151-76 (1950).
Although the forces inducing uniformity among group members are not fully understood, voluminous empirical research conducted over the past three decades suggests
they fall into two general categories. First, there are forces arising from conflicts within a
person who observes that his opinion or actions differ from those of the group. See Festinger & Aronson, The Arousal and Reduction of Dissonance in Social Contexts, in
GROUP DYNAMICS, supra, at 125. Second, there are forces brought to bear by other group
members seeking to influence the person's beliefs. Thus, group pressures may cause individual group members to alter their opinions, even as to matters of observable fact, to
conform to the opinions of the group. See GROUP DYNAMICS, supra, at 130-40; Asch, Ef•
fects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgments, in
GROUPS, LEADERSHIP & MEN 177 (H. Guetzkow ed. 1951 & photo. reprint 1962). Indeed,
where a single individual ia a minority of one against an otherwise-unanimous majority,
as may well be the case with Fraser, the pressure toward conformity could be even
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least one NLRB member has observed that intimate involvement in management and the operations of the employer might
alter the union's commitment to the bargaining unit - not because of corruption of interests in the traditional sense, but because involvement in management affairs may make the union
representative more attuned to management objectives and less
sensitive to employee goals. 180
If this danger is present even in normal business settings, it is
manifestly greater dramatically where an employer such as
Chrysler is engaged in a struggle for its very existence. 166 While
it may be true that the goals of management and employees are
the same in many ways, it is just as true that many times they
conflict. After wrestling with managerial problems in his capacity as corporate directoi:, could Fraser, or anyone, represent as
vigorously the employees in a dispute with Chrysler over, for example, a proposed speedup of the production line? As an officer
of the corporation, Fraser would have full appreciation of, and
indeed, great responsibility for Chrysler's financial solvency.
Under these circumstances, could he, with the same detachment
as before his election, protest an increased workload or select the
next strike ta.,get? The possibilty arises then, that employees
will be deprived of single-minded union representation, in derogation of their rights under the NLRA.

B. Redress for Inadequate Representation
If employees whose union has secured a seat on their em-

ployer's governing board become dissatisfied with the quality of
union representation, their avenues of recourse are limited. An
greater. See Asch, supra, at 185-88.
At the same time, by being a member of two groups, the Union and the Board, Fraser
will be influenced by frequently contradictory norms. Though the effect of conflicting
pressure from different reference groups has been studi~d in various contexts, see, e.g.,
T.M. NEWCOMB, Soc1AL PSYCHOLOGY 528-71 (1950); Killian, The Significance of MultiGroup Membership in Disaster, 57 AM. J. Soc. 309 (1952); Singer, Reference Groups
and Social Evaluations, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 66, 76 (M. Rosenberg & R. Turner eds.
1981), there are few conclusions concerning the conditions that may cause one group
norm to override others. See Siegel & Siegel, Reference Groups, Membership Groups,
and Attitude Change, 55 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 360 (1957).
165. Anchorage Community Hospital, Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. 575, 576-77 (1976) (Walther,
dissenting).
166. See Wall St. J., Feb. 25, 1982, at 4, col. 2 (Chrysler suffered net operating losses
of $475.6 million in 1981); N.Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1981, at 1, col. 2 (net operating loss of
$1.71 billion in 1980); N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1980, at 1, col. 1 (net operating loss of $1.1
billion in 1979); N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1979, § 4, at 1, col 3 (net loss of $204.6 million in
1978).
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employee can claim, either before the Board or the courts, that
the union is failing fairly to represent the members. Or, employees able to gamer the necessary support can petition the NLRB
for an election to decertify the union as the bargaining representative. In many cases, however, these options are more illusory
than real.
The power of union officials to exercise wide discretion in contract negotiations was emphasized in Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 167 where the Supreme Court observed that effective
.collective bargaining necessitated a broad delegation of authority to negotiators to make concessions and accept proposals if
in their view the interests of the parties would thereby best be
served. As a result, courts have accorded a "wide range of reasonableness" to unions negotiating agreements with
employees. 168
The NLRB position likewise is broadly accepting of union actions under duty-of-fair-representation standards; the Board envisions a circumscribed set of situations in which it will entertain charges of inadequate union representation. According to
the NLRB General Counsel, "if there is no independent evidence of bad motive, complaint will not issue where the union
gives some reasonable, judgemental [sic] explanation for its decision. If the union action passes these tests, . . . [the] proper recourse is the ballot box, not before the General Counsel or the
Board." 169
Under these formulae, absent evidence of overt wrongdoing,
should a union begin to place greater emphasis upon management's objectives as a result of its involvement in governing the
enterprise, it will undoubtedly have a "reasonable, judgmental"
rationale for a less aggressive bargaining posture. Certainly, a
167. 345 U.S. 330 (1953). The Ford Motor Company and the UAW had agreed to give
seniority credit for World War II veterans who had not worked for the company before
the war. This agreement was challenged by several employees, who claimed that the
UAW had breached its duty of fair representation by making a distinction on the basis
of a factor not related to wages and working conditions.
168. Inevitably differences arise in the manner and degree to which the terms of
any negotiated agreement affect individual employees and classes of employees.
The mere existence of such differences does not make them invalid. The complete satisfaction of all who are represented is hardly to be expected. A wide
range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in
serving the unit it represents, subject always to complete good faith and honesty
of purpose in the exercise of its discretion.
Id. at 337-38.
169. Address by NLRB General Counsel John S. Irvin, ABA Nat. Inst. on "The National Labor Relations Act - Current Review" 10 (Apr. 27, 1979) (on file with the Journal of Law Reform).
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bargaining position arguably based upon the long-term health of
the enterprise would fall within the "wide range of reasonableness" entrusted to unions engaged in negotiations. As a result,
disgruntled union members would find little hope under a dutyof-fair-representation theory for a successful challenge to a
"softer" position adopted by their bargaining representative.
Simultaneously, the General Counsel'.s invitation for dissatisfied employees to use the ballot box may be a hollow one, particulary where, as here, the employer's facilities are geographically dispersed ~d employees are covered by national
agreements. By way of illustration, the UAW represents in excess of one-hundred units of Chrysler employees, of which fortynine are production and maintenance units. The. employees in
these units are located throughout the United States as well as
Canada and Mexico, and are covered by uniform contracts negotiated on a national level. The UAW, like many other international unions, frequently petitions for individual units in the
name of the International and the Local. If the local union succeeds in an election, the unit then is merged into the nationwide
unit covering the relevant classifications of employees. These individual units cannot thereafter avoid application of a contract
approved by the nationwide constituency. Further, once the local union is certified or contractually recognized as part of a national unit, it cannot be decertified on an individual basis170
even if initially it would have been an appropriate bargaining
unit on its own; 171 the merger effectively destroys the separate
identity of the individual unit.1 72 Therefore, no single plant
could avoid being bound by a UAW contract, considering the
existence of a nationwide unit, a history of centralized bargaining, and coverage under a single contract, even if that plant
voted as a unit against the contract.1 78 Moreover, gathering the
thirty percent showing-of-interest174 necessary to bring about an
election would itself be a Herculean task beyond the reach even
of most large organizations. Such structural barriers thus require
170. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(A)(l)(ii) (1976); Fast Food Merchandisers, Inc., 242
N.L.R.B. 8 (1979); General Elec. Co., 180 N.L.R.B. 1094 (1970).
171. See Fast Food Merchandisers, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 8 (1979); W.A. Foote Memorial
Hospital, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 540 (1977).
172. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 29 (1979).
173. Cf. Univac Div. of Remington Rand Div. of Sperry Rand Corp., 137 N.L.R.B.
1232 (1962) (employee sought decertification of one plant out of a multiplant bargaining
unit, but was denied because the Board said that the individual certified units had been
merged into one overall unit and so could not later be decertified on an individual basis).
174. NLRB Statements of Procedure, Series 8, 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a) (1981); cf. id. §§
101.26, .27(a)(3) (initiation of rescission-of-authority cases also apply 30% rule).
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that tremendous organization and economic resources be marshalled to mount a campaign capable of decertifying a nationwide unit, and serve to make the ballot box a false hope in many
instances. 17~
CONCLUSION

Douglas Fraser's election to a position on the governing board
of the Chrysler Corporation constitutes a singular event in the
history of relations between organized labor and management in
this country. The union's assumption of a broader capacity in
the enterprise represents a marked departure from the limited,
adversarial role adopted nearly universally by unions in their
dealings with management over the past century. In this undertaking, union and management have embarked upon an experiment with nonadversarial relations at the policy-making level of
corporate governance.
The NLRA, for nearly a half-century the cornerstone of national labor policy, has institutionalized the limited pattern of
American labor-management relations. Despite the NLRA's adherence to this conventional model, however, decisions by the
courts and the NLRB indicate clearly that Fraser's participation
in corporate governance does not run afoul of the Act. The premise that union officials serving as corporate directors will remain loyal to employee interests dictates that, without more,
Fraser's new duties will not be considered inherently injurious to
employee interests.
By their agreement, the UAW and Chrysler are venturing into
uncharted waters of employment relations. In so doing, they
have set aside antagonistic positions and recognized their mutual interdependence, in developments that seem wholly salubrious. At the same time, Fraser appears fully capable of addressing the problems confronting the corporation while continuing to
advance the best interests of auto industry employees.
In other instances, though, the liberal acceptance of unions in
175. These difficulties, however, may be largely hypothetical when applied specifically to the issues of Fraser's election to the Chrysler board, due to the general satisfaction with the arrangement among UAW members. Accounts from union members and
negotiators as well as from fellow directors and management officials indicate that Fraser
has continued to represent his constituents vigorously and responsibly. See Wall St. J.,
Mar. 12, 1981, at 33, col. 4. Moreover, the UAW has a long record and tradition of integrity and fidelity to the desires of the membership. See James, Union Democracy and the
L.M.R.D.A., 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 247, 353 (1978).
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corporate governance may present grave dangers; many unions
may be less responsive than the UAW to the needs of their
memberships. As one prominent union president has cautioned,
an inherent risk increasing the scope of union functions "is that
the union will eventually end up negotiating with itself. A corollary risk is that ... [a]s worker representatives on directing
boards become more and more involved in management's
problems, they are likely to become less and less responsive to
the needs of those they represent." 178 Where the Board's presumption of continuing union loyalty proves misguided, disaffected employees may have little opportunity to remedy the
union's subsequent inadequate representation of their interests.
If employees cannot fully redress their grievances either through
the legal system or through collective bargaining, they might
well turn to other, less peaceful means. It would be tragically
ironic if accommodation of nonadversarial employment relations, as embodied in the Chrysler-UAW agreement, engendered
frustration and strife of the sort the NLRA was designed to
abate.

176. Address by William Winpisinger, supra note 26, at 6.

